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The University of Western Australia 
 
 
To  determine  whether  the  Western  Australian  (WA)  Government’s  ‘royalties  for 
regions’ policy will enhance economic welfare it is necessary to: know the net fiscal 
transfer that the community wants the State Government to provide between Perth 
and regional WA; and determine whether the royalties for regions policy brings the 
Government closer to, or further away from, that goal.  In recognition of this, it is 
recommended that the State’s public accounts be complemented by a new budget 
paper that reports on public finances for ‘Perth’ and the ‘Regions’ separately, which 
will improve government accountability, and classifies mineral royalties as ‘capital’ 
revenues,  which  will  enhance  sustainability  provided  these  capital  revenues  are 
hypothecated for expenditure on capital projects. 
 
 
In the lead up to the Western Australian (WA) election held on Saturday, 6 September 2008, 
the  State’s  National  Party,  under  the  leadership  of  Brendon  Grylls,  campaigned  as  an 
independent political party.  The National Party’s election platform centred on its ‘royalties 
for regions’ proposal under which 25 percent of the State’s royalties would be paid into a 
special  fund  each  year  and  hypothecated  for  expenditure  on  regional  investment.    One 
outcome of the election was that the National Party acquired the balance of power in the 
WA’s  Legislative  Assembly.    After  negotiations  with  both  major  political  parties,  the 
National  Party  entered  into  a  power  sharing  arrangement  with  the  Liberal  Party,  which 
facilitated the appointment of the Liberal’s Colin Barnett as the Premier of WA.  
 
At this still early stage in the Barnett Government’s first term, the ‘royalties for regions’ 
program remains a general agreement on underlying principles.  The aggregates are broadly 
known,  as  one  quarter  of  the  State’s  royalties  equates  to  about  $675  million  and  total 
funding under this program will be capped at $1 billion per year (Grylls 2008).  However, 
the details of the program are still being finalised.  Local press reports have suggested that 
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the  main  sticking  point  between  the  two  parties  concerned  the  question  of  whether  the 
forward estimates of expenditure prepared by the previous (Labor) State Government, led by 
Premier  Alan  Carpenter,  should  or  should  not  represent  the  benchmark  from  which  the 




From  a  practical  perspective,  the  focus  on  changes  to  the  forward  estimates  is  indeed 
understandable.  However, from a policy perspective, that is just a small part of a larger 
picture.  A more fundamental issue concerns the development of a fiscal framework for this 
program that will facilitate public accountability and sustainable outcomes.  When royalties 
for regions measures are announced in the May 2009 State Budget, it is important that all 
fiscal elements associated with this policy be fully reported for geographically defined areas. 
Otherwise, the social and economic welfare propositions underlying the State’s resource 
allocation will only be revealed in a partial and distorted manner, making it difficult, if not 
impossible, for observers and the community at large to assess the overall economic and 
social consequences of fiscal transfers within areas of the State. 
 
Accountability in WA 
 
Accountability will, in my view, be best served through the introduction of a new budget 
paper that decomposes the current State government accounts into two component accounts: 
first, the ‘Perth accounts’, being the WA Government Accounts for the Perth Statistical 
Division; and second, the ‘regional accounts’, being the WA Government Accounts for all 
regions outside the Perth Statistical Division.  The goal of the proposed new budget paper is 
to explicitly identify and report: the geographic origin of public revenues; the geographic 
destination  of  public  expenditures;  and  the  consequent,  positive  or  negative,  net  fiscal 
transfer between Perth and regions.  In short, the purpose of the proposal is to better inform 
public debate on the relative net contributions of Perth and the regions to the State as a 
whole.  
 
At this stage, information is not publicly available to enable the decomposition of the State 
accounts into component geographically defined accounts, or even to identify the direction 
of net fiscal transfers within the State.  While royalties may suggest a partial fiscal transfer 
from the regions to Perth, State taxes are mainly collected in Perth and the cost of service 
                                                
2 Examples include the West Australian, ‘Grylls to stand firm over Royalties for Regions’ (20 October 2008), 
and The Australian, ‘Colin Barnett's backflip on mining royalties’ (24 October 2008).  
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provision  in  regions  is  typically  higher  than  in  the  metropolitan  area.    The  geographic 
direction of net fiscal transfers within WA as a result of State Government activity simply 
remains uncertain.  Consequently, the proposed new budget paper should include ‘Perth’ and 
‘regional’ accounts for a number of years immediately prior the introduction of the ‘royalties 
for regions’ program. As the ‘royalties for regions’ program represents a major re-allocation 
of  State  resources  within  WA,  special  ‘Perth’  and  ‘regional’  accounts  should  also  be 
extended beyond the budget year (2009–10) and across the forward estimates period too.  
The resulting mini time-series would not only reveal the immediate net redistributive effect 
of the ‘royalties for regions’ program, it would also assist informed discussion of the State 
Government’s general net fiscal transfer between Perth and the regions, or the regions and 
Perth, before and after the implemental of the ‘royalties for regions’ program.
3  
 
A number of significant complexities associated with implicit and explicit inter-regional 
spill-over effects
4 will need to be considered when decomposing the State’s accounts in the 
manner suggested above.  For example, some expenses incurred in Perth implicitly provide 
benefits to residents of regional WA (e.g. central policy and central administration and co-
ordination) and some other expenses incurred in regional WA implicitly provide benefits to 
residents of Perth (e.g. State road spending).  Moreover, some revenues are collected in one 
region when the activity being taxed spills across metropolitan and non-metropolitan regions 
of the State, an issue that is further complicated by the employment of progressive revenue 
raising scales with grouping and / or aggregation provisions, as in the case of payroll and 
land  tax.    Consideration  will  also  need  to  be  given  to  accounting  for  deliberate  policy 
directed spill-over effects such as intended cross subsidies between Perth and the regions 
associated with services provided by government corporations, through community service 
obligations or through Government restrictions that prevent full cost pricing (e.g. uniform 
tariff policy). 
 
The federal fiscal dimension to state public finances adds further complexity to this matter.  
The State’s share of national goods and services tax (GST) collections and general health 
funding is determined by a distribution formula designed to achieve ‘fiscal equalization’.  As 
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by  fiscally  equalised  local  governments  within  the  State.    Indeed,  information  derived  from  such  a 
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such, these grants are distributed in shares that provide a subsidy to states to compensate 
them for above average costs of service provision (such as high costs related to dispersion or 
to  diseconomies  of  scale  etc)  and  below  average  capacity  to  raise  State  revenue.    This 
subsidy is funded by the remaining states with below average costs of service provision and 
above average capacity to raise State revenues.  The resulting fiscal equalization formula is 
designed so that: 
 
State governments should receive funding from the pool of goods and services 
tax revenue and health care grants such that, if each made the same effort to 
raise revenue from its own sources and operated at the same level of efficiency, 
each would have the capacity to provide services at the same standard. (CGC 
2005: 4) 
 
Three  issues  need  to  be  highlighted  here.    The  first  concerns  the  extent  to  which 
Commonwealth grants to WA come from revenues collected in WA.  Fortunately this issue 
may be readily solved.  In 2006-07, the Commonwealth collected $6.2 billion more from the 
WA  economy  than  it  returned  to  the  State  in  grants  to  the  State  Government  or  direct 
expenditure  by  the  Commonwealth  within  the  State  (Government  of  WA,  2008:  81).  
Consequently, it can be safely assumed that all Commonwealth grants to WA are funded 
from revenue collected from within the State.  The second issue concerns the influence of 
regional areas within the State on grants that the Commonwealth pays to WA.  This will 
require the separate identification of the value of Commonwealth grants to the State from 
revenue originally collected from ‘Perth’ and from the ‘regions’ of WA.  The third issue 
concerns the impact of the Commonwealth Grants Commission’s (CGC) treatment of fiscal 
activity within the State.  This will require that the distinct ‘Perth’ and ‘regional’ accounts 
for the State to be reported in two stages: first on a ‘gross’  basis, unadjusted  for CGC 
effects; and then on a ‘net’ basis, reporting major fiscal magnitudes after adjustment for 
CGC effects.  
 
In the WA context, the CGC’s impact on the State’s budget balance differs depending on 
whether its assessments concern expenses or revenues.  The CGC recognizes that costs faced 
by the WA government are typically above average and these tend to increase the State’s 
GST share, whereas the State’s revenue raising capacities are typically above average and 
serve  to  reduce  the  State’s  GST  share.  As  such,  the  gross  expense  incurred  on,  say 
education,  recorded  in  the  State’s  regional  accounts  would  reflect  the  actual  expense 
incurred  in  providing  education  services  to  residents  of  regional  WA,  whereas  the  net  
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expense for such services would be something less than the actual expense incurred because 
the CGC implicitly compensates the  State for the relatively high  education costs  that it 
incurs as a result of dispersion and isolation.  In the case of revenues, say, mineral royalties, 
the  gross  revenue  that  should  be  recorded  in  the  State’s  regional  accounts  would  be 
represented by the actual royalties collected by the State, while net royalties received by the 
State would be very much less because the net effect of the CGC process is to redistribute 
most of the States royalties among the other states (by decreasing WA’s GST share and 
increasing the share of GST allocated to other states). 
 
These accounting difficulties are not insignificant and they ensure that the decomposition of 
the State’s public accounts into reliable ‘Perth’ and ‘regional’ accounts will be a non-trivial 
exercise  for  the  public sector.    Nevertheless,  the  WA  Treasury  has  previously  published 
analysis of the net effect of Commonwealth fiscal activities on the States (Government of 
WA  2008)  in  which  similar  spill-over  type  problems  have  been  dealt  with,  such  as  the 
treatment of expenses and benefits associated with the provision of nation public goods.  In 
addition, the State’s Treasury has the capacity to estimate the net impact of CGC assessments 
on specific revenue and expense items reported in the State budget. On balance, it can be 
safely assumed that the WA Treasury can decompose the State’s public accounts to produce 
reliable ‘Perth’ and ‘regional’ accounts in a systematic and impartial manner.  
 
Sustainability in WA 
 
Sustainability is very often discussed in a broad economic, social and environmental context, 
with  emphasis  given  to the sustainable  character of:  private economic returns, net social 
benefits;  and  the  ecology  and  the  natural  environment.  Indeed,  the  broad  approach  to 
sustainability is associated with the notion of the ‘triple bottom line’, where firms extend 
their  motivation  beyond  profit  generation  to  include  social  and  environmental  goals  that 
complement broad sustainability.  In this essay, however, the broad view of sustainability is 
not utilised.  Rather, a context specific and narrower economic perspective on sustainability 
is adopted under which sustainability depends only on the maintenance of the aggregate real 
economic value of assets owned by the State, be they natural resources or manmade physical 
capital  goods.    This  narrow  approach  has  been  adopted  here  to  direct  discussion  of 
sustainability towards the economic interest that each citizen of the State has in maintaining 
(or enhancing) the real value of commonly owned public property over time.   
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Natural resources are the property of the State or, more concretely, the property of the people 
of WA now and over the full life of the State i.e. current and future generations of Western 
Australians.  Resource royalties may be considered a payment to the State in exchange for 
giving up title to a resource.  As the title to a resource sold by the State was effectively owned 
by current and future generations, there is an obligation on the State to largely transform that 
royalty stream into publicly owned assets that will provide benefits for current and future 
generations.  Great care will be needed to ensure that the operational details of the ‘royalties 
for regions’ program is sustainable in the sense that it does not deprive future generations 
from sharing in the benefits of WA’s current royalties. 
 
As WA is part of a federation, it is socially fitting for the benefits from naturally endowed 
resources to be shared nationally and economically appropriate for this to be done without 
distorting resource allocation between regions across Australia.  This is usually expressed in a 
context where resource royalties are presented as economic ‘rents’ (or a surplus over the cost 
of  production)  that  will  distort  the  migration  decisions  of  labour  if  royalty  receipts  are 
expended in only one region of the nation.  As such, redistribution of resource rents on a per 
capita basis across the states may act to reduce distortions to individuals’ location decisions 
that would lead to resource rich areas becoming over populated.
5  Even though the emphasis 
in the preceding paragraph reflects the view that resources are publicly owned ‘endowments’ 
and that royalties are the price paid for an economic good, and not a pure economic rent, the 
logic  underling  the  efficiency  of  redistributing  resource  rents  can  be  extended  to  the 
‘endowment’  conception  of  royalties  when  the  exploitation  of  natural  endowments  is 
efficient
6 and citizen’s rates of time preference are broadly consistent.  
 
The CGC attempts, to the best of its ability, to distribute the GST among States in a manner 
that removes inefficient distortions related to resource royalties.  Fault may surely be found 
with  the  CGC’s  royalty  assessment  mechanism,  but  not  so  with  the  objective  of  its 
assessment,  at  least  not  once  it  is  accepted  that  it  is  appropriate  for  Australia  to  be  an 
economically  and  socially  integrated  federation.    Once  the  net  impact  of  the  CGC’s 
assessment is accepted, and the majority of the State’s royalties redistributed in the form of 
                                                
5 The relationship between rents, equalization and efficiency is discussed in Boadway and Flatters (1982) and 
extended by Petchey (1995) who looks at the effect of interaction between rents and differences in unit costs 
between states. 
6 Among other things, an efficient resource market would require different prices (i.e. different royalty rates) to 
reflect varying economic qualities of minerals and mineral deposits.  While WA does not formally vary royalty 
rates with resource quality / extraction costs, it could be suggested that this is approximately achieved through 
the use of project specific Agreement Acts between the State and resource companies.  For example, in the 
specific case of iron ore, the royalty rates specified in many Agreement Acts differ depending on the type of ore 
extracted.  
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increased GST grants to mineral royalty poor states and reduced GST grants to WA and 
mineral royalty rich states, the State should adopt a deliberate policy of quarantining the 
remaining ‘net’ royalties, i.e. royalties effectively retained ex-post of the fiscal equalization 
process, from the recurrent budget.  In the interests of intergenerational efficiency and equity, 
those  funds  would  be  best  treated  as  capital  revenues  and  should  be  employed  in  the 
acquisition of public assets.  Of course, this approach should not be limited to WA.  States 
that  receive  a  share  of  WA’s  royalties  via  increased  GST  revenues  should  similarly 
hypothecate those funds into a capital income account.
7  Furthermore, in the interest of inter-
regional  efficiency  and equity,  this  information  should  be  clearly  evident  in  WA’s  State 
public accounts, including in the component accounts for ‘Perth’ and the ‘regions’.  
 
It might be objected that the proposed treatment of resource royalties in the State budget 
papers is unnecessary because the value of the State’s capital works program already exceeds 
the value of royalties.  However, I think that point of view suffers from three weaknesses.  
First,  much  of  the  State’s  capital  works  program  is  due  to  the  activities  of  government 
corporations, whereas the correct comparative focus should be made with respect to general 
government capital works.  Second, any surplus or deficit between royalty revenues collected 
and the value of capital expenditure will, in all likelihood, vary substantially between Perth 
and  regional  WA,  and  the  reporting  of  such  differences  is  important.    Third,  future 
generations, located in Perth or the regions, would be justified in expecting an explicit public 
record of the specific State assets provided for them by their parents’ generation in exchange 
for the State’s natural resources.  As physical manmade assets tend to depreciate while the 
real value of resource deposits tend to appreciate, sustainability will, at the very least, require 
that income from such income generating assets be hypothecated to cover the depreciation in 
the value of these assets. When royalties are transformed into non-income generating assets, 
depreciation  costs  will  need  to  be  funded  from  general  revenue  to  ensure  that  current 
generations do not benefit at the expense of future generations, as this would compromise 
sustainability.  
 
A Hope: greater clarity in public finances to facilitate better political debate 
 
In the lead up to the last State election, the need for a clear understanding of the relative 
contribution  of  Perth  and  the  regions  to  the  State’s  public  accounts  was  repeatedly 
emphasised.  I recall assertions in the media that Perth is riding on the back of the regions 
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of Australia, but changes of that character are too hypothetical to be considered in this general essay.  
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being  met  by  assertions  to  the  opposite  effect.    The  fundamental  problem  was  that  the 
information required for the matter to be effectively debated was simply not available to the 
public.  It is my great hope that the WA State government will introduce the new budget 
paper proposed in this essay so that, when the matter is debated during future elections, the 
debate  can  be informed  and meaningful.   It is  also hoped that reporting  royalties in  the 
‘regional’  budget  as  capital  income,  which  is  earmarked  for  ‘Perth’  and  ‘regional’ 
expenditures on physical capital with a real economic value that is equivalent to that of the 
mineral  resource  given  up  (with  the  real  capital  value  maintained  over  time  through  the 
imposition of depreciation charges), will improve the framework through which issues of 
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